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DISABLING PHILOSOPHY 
 
Data compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Disability Employment Policy 
indicates that the disparity between the labor-participation rates of employable disabled people 
and employable nondisabled people across all sectors of American society is abysmal: 21% for 
disabled people compared to 69% for nondisabled people. More specific figures for the disparity 
between disabled and nondisabled people employed as full-time faculty in academia are even 
worse, with philosophy boasting the greatest disparity in this regard of all disciplines in the 
humanities and social sciences, comparable only to the STEM fields. For although disabled 
people comprise an estimated 20-25% of the North American population, surveys conducted in 
2012 and 2013 by the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (APA) suggest 
that they comprise less than 4% of full-time faculty in philosophy departments in the U.S. and, 
according to a 2013 survey conducted by the Equity Committee of the Canadian Philosophical 
Association (CPA), they comprise less than 1% of full-time faculty in philosophy departments in 
Canada. In other words, nondisabled people comprise an estimated 96-99% of full-time faculty 
in North American philosophy departments. These figures are shocking, constituting almost 
complete exclusion of disabled people from professional philosophy. 
 
Why is there such a striking disparity between the percentage of disabled people in the 
general population and the percentage of disabled people in professional philosophy? Why is 
there virtually no disabled people employed full-time in North American philosophy 
departments? Are there no disabled philosophers? Is there some characteristic, trait, or sensibility 
that all disabled people intrinsically possess that makes them especially averse to philosophical 
inquiry? Are disabled people, as a social group, somehow better-suited to other areas of the 
humanities or not suited for academia at all? 
 
Rather than attribute the grievous demographics of professional philosophy to some 
feature or characteristic inherent to disabled people, that is, to some individual or collective 
deficiency, defect, or flaw intrinsic to disabled people themselves (a standard response when 
ableism in any sphere or facet of culture and society is pointed out), we should turn the critical 
gaze back onto professional philosophy itself in order to discern both the best explanation for 
why there are so few disabled people in its ranks and the best answer to the question of what 
should be done to rectify this unacceptable state of affairs. For surely we philosophers agree that 
there should be a concerted profession-wide response to the current situation, that is, we can 
surely agree that something pro-active must be done about the egregious under-representation of 
disabled people in philosophy. Or can “we”? 
 
I asked myself that self-same question again recently when I read esteemed feminist 
philosopher Ann Cudd’s featured post on the Pea Soup blog in which Cudd (1) articulated 
prevalent misconceptions about disabled people by (among other things) equating “permanently 
disabled” with permanently unemployable, wholly incapacitated, and necessarily dependent; and  
objectified and essentialized disabled people by referring to us as “the disabled.” Given that 
these and other uninformed views and implicit biases about disabled people underlie the 
philosophical perspectives that many philosophers hold (after all, Cudd’s remarks are responses 
to and participate in a prominent discourse of political philosophy and ethics), it is no wonder 
that “permanently disabled” people are not regarded as viable colleagues in the profession, nor 
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considered worthy of the role of “professional philosopher.” Similar, and even more harmful, 
misconceptions about disabled people can be identified in cognitive science, bioethics, and other 
sub-disciplines. In fact, much of the very subject matter of philosophy runs counter to efforts to 
increase the representation of disabled people in the profession. 
 
In October 2013, I published an article entitled “Introducing Feminist Philosophy of 
Disability” in a special issue of Disability Studies Quarterly (DSQ) whose theme is Improving 
Feminist Philosophy and Theory by Taking Account of Disability. Given its role as an 
introduction to the special issue, the article is designed to provide a context within which readers 
of the journal unfamiliar with the demographics of philosophy can situate the contributions to the 
issue; hence, the introduction identifies noteworthy institutional, structural, discursive, and 
material factors that contribute to the hostile environment that disabled philosophers confront 
and delegitimize research and teaching in philosophy of disability. I was concerned to show how 
some of the central institutions and venues of the discipline and profession of philosophy – 
including the APA and the New APPS and Leiter Reports blogs – were (each in its own ways) 
biased against disabled people and treat them unequally, as well as show how other influential 
elements of the field – such as PhilJobs and PhilPapers – diminish the importance of philosophy 
of disability, disqualifying it from the realm of what counts as philosophy. The article spells out 
how the APA (its website, conferences, committee structure, and so on) has systematically failed 
to represent disabled philosophers equally; how the architecture of PhilJobs and PhilPapers 
implicitly and structurally precludes critical work on disability; how feminist philosophers 
reproduce ableism in their work; and how the ableist language and other discursive practices of 
numerous philosophy blogs variously demean disabled people and contribute to the exclusion of 
disabled philosophers.  
 
In the six months since I published the DSQ article, little in philosophy has changed: The 
APA has taken no noticeable measures to include vital information missing from its website, nor 
has it redesigned the inaccessible website itself, nor has it acted in any significant way upon any 
of the other criticisms or recommendations that I make in the article; the conceptual and 
organizational frameworks of PhilPapers and PhilJobs have not been modified, but rather 
continue to respectively marginalize and obscure research and teaching in the area of philosophy 
of disability, for the most part classifying work on disability in medical terms and ignoring its 
political character; some philosophy blogs continue to generate discursive practices that degrade 
disabled people and discount disabled philosophers and philosophy of disability; and most 
mainstream feminist philosophers continue to conceptualize and write about feminism and 
diversity in terms that limit their scope to gender alone, or to gender, race, and sexuality, or to 
gender, race, and class, producing “intersectional” analyses that essentially boil down to 
considerations of (binary) gender to which race and sexuality or race and class are rather 
haphazardly added and in whose terms disability is nowhere to be found. Notably, the New 
APPS blog altered the practices for which I criticized it in the article, with John Protevi at New 
APPS blogging about my DSQ article and the entire issue and emphasizing their importance for 
the field, as well as posting links to the article and table of contents for the issue. 
 
The intransigence of the aforementioned formally and informally institutionalized 
dimensions of the discipline and profession notwithstanding, there does, nevertheless, seem (or 
so I would like to think) to be an upsurge of recognition amongst some philosophers that 
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disabled people are under-represented in, and have been systematically excluded from, the 
profession of philosophy; that philosophical claims, arguments, and positions are thoroughly 
embedded in a complicated matrix of ableist, racist, sexist, heterosexist, and classist force 
relations; and that the uncritical reproduction of these relations of power within philosophy 
constitutes a host of injustices that must be eliminated. 
 
Useful links: 
http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3877/3402 
http://dsq-sds.org/issue/view/108 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disability/ 
 
